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A QUIXOTIC QUEST OVER BEFOGGED TERRAIN? 
HOW TO CHOOSE AND CONTEST A DEPOSITION’S LOCATION 
UNDER FEDERAL PROCEDURAL LAW 
Amir Shachmurove* 
ABSTRACT 
Rather than something extraordinary, this article strives to provide 
something ordinary—a rough map, an assured but imperfect sketch—
sorely needed by practitioners yet strangely missing from modern 
commentary, scholarly and otherwise. In less than 10,000 words, it 
summarizes the presumptions, precedents, and provisions applicable to 
a court’s decision regarding the proper location of a deposition under 
federal law, whether embodied in explicit text or conveyed in often 
qualified prose. As it shows, in making these fact-specific 
determinations over the last fifty years, this nation’s federal courts have 
mined a default presumption from Rule 30, focused their energies on 
Rule 26, and crafted two more tenets and at least two substantially 
identical, and increasingly narrowed, tests. Indubitably, these ad hoc 
analyses have engendered a perplexing and contradictory body of law. 
Yet, in the midst of this jarring cacophony, directions for the busy can 
be imparted, and checklists adumbrated. In an era of transnational 
defendants and cross-border cases, even such tentative directions can 
aid the pressured and puzzled. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Crafted by men focused on the loosening of the common law’s 
stultifying formalism,1 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules” 
collectively, and “Rule” individually) say little about the proper location 
for a deposition of a person, whether a citizen or non-citizen and 
whether living in or out of the United States. Rule 30 plainly allows a 
party to “by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, 
without leave of court except as provided in Rule 30(a)(2),”2 but nothing 
as to any such querying’s setting appears in this provision, the Rules’ 
fifth title, or the Rules as a whole. Like purest nature, though, few 
federal courts3 can tolerate a vacuum and stomach taciturnity’s 
perpetration; even if so inclined, not even the most artful can always 
evade a case and controversy merely by a confession of bemusement or 
befuddlement. Due to the inevitable byproduct of this process—too 
much imperfect precedent and too many inconsistent holdings—those 
searching for guidance concerning this fraught issue face the near 
certainty of cumbersome exegeses of haphazard dogmas and false 
doctrinal leads, ones likely to yield, with only a few exceptions, mostly 
questionable conclusions.  
Nonetheless, some definite instructions can be mined from this 
muddled jurisprudence, as this brief article—and its appendix—dare to 
delineate. If only tentatively, a relatively stable atlas, a virtue so crucial 
for the preservation of hoary equity,4 can be sketched, a protean reality 
familiar to the seafarers of yesteryear. At minimum, it is more than what 
has formerly existed, providing a bit of the predictability and certainty 
so crucial to the reasoned exercise of even the most generous bequest of 
procedural discretion.   
 
* Amir Shachmurove is an associate at Troutman Sanders LLP who can always be reached at 
ashachmurove@post.harvard.edu. He dedicates this article, more practical and less academic than his 
usual fare due partly to a diligent group of student editors, to the wisest and warmest of colleagues: 
Alonso J. Cisneros, Bryanna R. Rainwater, Erin O’Neil Ashby, Kelly Mufarrige, S.R. Sidarth, and 
Valarie J. Livengood. As always, of course, all the views expressed, and mistakes made herein, are the 
author’s own, and this article is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.  
 1. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 924–25 (1987). 
 2. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1). 
 3. Unless otherwise noted, any reference to “court” or “courts” is to one or more United States 
district courts or courts of appeals. If capitalized, however, the term “Court” refers to the United States 
Supreme Court in accordance with The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation. 
 4. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Toward a Practical Definition of the Rule of Law, 46 JUDGES J. 4, 5 
(2007) (characterizing openness and stability as the essential predicates for the rule of law).  
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II. LEGAL SURVEY: IDENTIFYING RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND 
PRECEDENTS 
As originally written and as subsequently amended, the Rules evince 
a maddening silence with regard to the choice of a deposition’s location, 
particularly as to depositions governed by Rule 30(a)(1) and Rule 
30(b)(6).5 Unsurprisingly, “a confusing, and sometimes inconsistent, 
line of caselaw” has festered due to this willful reticence.6 This mostly 
accurate declamation, however, neglects the lighthouses—not strikingly 
luminous yet incontestably real—dotting this anarchic landscape. Over 
the last five decades, with only occasional inconsistencies, sundry courts 
have extracted a default presumption from Rule 30, made much of Rule 
26, and formulated two more tenets and at least two substantially 
identical tests, tapering their analytical focus to two factors: (1) whether 
the deponent is an individual party or a representative of an 
organization, and (2) whether the party is a plaintiff or defendant. In that 
tense period in which lawyers debate a deposition’s location, it is these 
seemingly settled, but variable, patterns and prevalent, yet contested, 
notions with which every lawyer must be conversant. 
A. Extrinsic Sources: Universal Precepts 
Apart from the texts, two verities influence the judiciary’s application 
of these nebulous touchstones. Relevant to even the most specific 
provision’s explication, courts tend to view the Rules as “an integrated 
whole.”7 Consequently, in courts’ reckoning, the discovery rules amount 
to “an integrated mechanism to be read in pari materia.”8 One rule’s 
construction, in other words, must be consistent not just with its explicit 
text but the Rules in toto.9 Furthermore, the Rules’ “deposition-
discovery regime” has always been seen as “an extremely permissive 
one,” overwhelmingly tilted in favor of minimally reasonable 
 
  5. See, e.g., SEC v. Banc de Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34373, at *8, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2014); Arabi Gin Co. v. Plexus Cotton, Ltd. 
(In re Joseph Walker & Co.), 472 B.R. 696, 699–700 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012); In re Outsidewall Tire 
Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 470–71 (E.D. Va. 2010).  
 6. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Location of Party-Depositions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 
RES GESTAE 358 (Feb. 1994). 
 7. Garza v. Webb Cty., 296 F.R.D. 511, 512 (S.D. Tex. 2014); see also, e.g., Cipollone v. 
Liggett Grp., Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting with approval Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 
Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 92–93 (D.N.J. (1986)). 
 8. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc. v. Furniture USA, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 255, 258 (M.D.N.C. 
2001); see also Mortg. Info. Servs. v. Kitchens, 210 F.R.D. 562, 566–67 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (noting that 
“the traditional canons of interpretation regarding the interaction between the various Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure . . . require that the rules be construed in a manner that is internally consistent”). 
 9. Amir Shachmurove, Purchasing Claims and Changing Votes: Establishing “Cause” under 
Rule 3018(a), 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 511, 532 (2015). 
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discovery.10 As one court aptly observed, the Rules’ design and spirit 
compel “a broad and liberal treatment” so as to allow parties to “refine 
the case and . . . prepare it for trial based on a full understanding of the 
relevant facts.”11 In spite of recent precedent and amendments in tension 
with this forgiving penchant, this longstanding ideal endures.12 Acting 
concurrently, this vision of the Rules in general and Title V in particular 
as an integrated series of commands to be construed, by default, so as to 
enhance the uncovering and winnowing of facts influence the federal 
courts’ approach to the determination of a deposition’s appropriate 
locale whenever a deponent challenges another’s initially unfettered 
choice. 
B. Written Laws 
1. Depositions Generally: Rule 30’s Implicit and Explicit Restrictions 
Since Title V’s limited rearrangement in 1970, Rule 30 has controlled 
the conduct of all depositions by oral examination,13 recognizing no 
distinction between de bene esse (or trial) and discovery depositions like 
some of the Rules’ state analogues.14 Per Rule 30(a)(1), a party may 
depose “any person, including a party, without leave of court, except as 
provided in Rule 30(a)(2),” and attendance of a deponent, whether a 
party or not, “may be compelled by subpoena under Rule 45.”15 
Typically, a notice issued by a plaintiff suffices to compel the 
attendance of a party at a deposition.16 Rule 30(a)(2) requires judicial 
permission in only four separate instances: (1) whenever the parties have 
 
 10. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Hechinger Inv. Co. of Delaware, Inc. v. Friedman 
(In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman), 350 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Schlagenhauf v. 
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114–15, 85 S. Ct. 234, 241, 13 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1964) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 501, 507, 67 S. Ct. 385, 392, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661, 670–71 (D. Kan. 2004) (emphasizing 
“the broad and liberal construction afforded by the federal discovery rules”). 
 11. In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d at 69; Arthur R. Miller, Reflections on 
the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 353–56 (2013). 
 12. Amir Shachmurove, Policing Boilerplate: Reckoning and Reforming Rule 34’s Popular—yet 
Problematic—Construction, 37 N. Ill. U. L. REV. 203, 212 n.38 (2017). 
 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 30; Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 14. Chrysler Int’l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1362 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1); see, e.g., Luckey v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:13-cv-00332-
AWI-SAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179446, at *3, 2014 WL 7409034, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2014); 
Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 1944). 
 16. E.g., Bailey v. Connolly (In re Van Vleet), Nos. 08-cv-00506-WYD, 08-cv-01645-WYD, 
08-cv-01870-WYD, 08-cv-02109-WYD, 09-cv-00433-WYD, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 953, at *12–13, 
2009 WL 3162212, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2009); In re Honda, 106 B.R. 209, 211 (Bankr. D. Haw. 
1989); Farquhar v. Shelden, 116 F.R.D. 70, 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Cont’l Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Delta Corp. of Am., 71 F.R.D. 697, 699 (W.D. Okla. 1976). 
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not stipulated to a deposition and (a) “the deposition would result in 
more than 10 depositions being taken under this rule or Rule 31 by the 
plaintiffs, or by the defendants, or by the third-party defendants”; (b) 
“the deponent has already been deposed in the case;” or (c) “the party 
seeks to take the deposition before the time specified in Rule 26(d), 
unless the party certifies in the notice, with supporting facts, that the 
deponent is expected to leave the United States and be unavailable for 
examination in this country after that time; or (2) whenever the deponent 
is imprisoned.”17 As Rule 30 implies, in this authorized exercise of 
discretion, a court is expected to employ the proportionality test now set 
forth in Rule 26(b)(1) and (2)(C) and once encoded in Rule 
26(b)(2)(C).18 In essence, via Rule 26, a party can overcome Rule 30’s 
presumptive limit by demonstrating any additional depositions’ 
reasonableness and necessity.19  
Rule 30(b) sets forth numerous formal procedural requirements.20 Its 
first paragraph specifies what the requisite notice must generally 
include.21 Rule 30(b)(6) modifies those prerequisites when either “notice 
or subpoena” is directed at “a public or private corporation, a 
partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity.”22 
Upon receipt of a notice sent pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), “the named 
organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or 
managing agents, or . . . other persons who consent to testify on its 
behalf;” it may even “set out the matters on which each person 
designated will testify,” though “a subpoena,” but not a notice, “must 
advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make this designation.”23 
The person so selected must “testify about information known or 
reasonably available to the organization.”24 Despite this sentence’s 
seemingly plain meaning, a split of authority has arisen as to when and 
 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2); Smith v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 302 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D. 
Fla. 2014). 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2); Wertz v. GEA Heat Exchangers Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1991, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 167947, at *5–6, 2015 WL 8959408, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2015). 
 19. See, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., No. Civ. A. 03-1519 (AET), 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59095, at *8, 2006 WL 6487632, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2006). 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b); Healthier Choice Flooring, LLC v. CCA Global Partners, Inc., No. 
1:11-CV-2504-CAP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193345, at *5–6, 2013 WL 12101905, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 
4, 2013). 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(1); Mealing v. Ga. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 564 F. App’x 421, 429 
(11th Cir. 2014). 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6); In re Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 745 F.3d 216, 218 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6); Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 528 F. App’x 96, 103 n.7 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6); Gonzalez Prod. Sys. v. Martinrea Int’l Inc., 310 F.R.D. 341, 342–43 
(E.D. Mich. 2015). 
5
Shachmurove: Contesting Deposition Locations
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
950 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
how a party can use a Rule 30(b)(6) designee at trial.25 Despite this 
debate and its intricacy, Rule 30(b)(6) “does not preclude a deposition 
by any other procedure allowed by the [R]ules,”26 and “[t]he parties may 
stipulate—or the court may on motion order—that a deposition be taken 
by telephone or other remote means.,27 Unsurprisingly, however, the text 
itself does not codify a standard for adjudicating the merits of such 
accommodations.28  
Customarily, and certainly in its early decades, Rule 30(b) has been 
and was read to allow the examining party to “unilaterally” choose the 
location of the deposition of party and non-party alike.29  
2. Deposition by Subpoena: The Problems Presented by Rule 45 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1783 
If the proposed deponent is not a party and does not consent to attend, 
a subpoena is the only alternative under the Rules. In such cases, Rule 
45 governs that writ’s service and the deposition’s location.30 True, 
“nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly precludes the 
use of Rule 45 subpoenas against parties,” including a governmental 
entity.31 And when the location of the depositions for a subpoenaed 
party engenders dispute, courts only inconsistently invoke its geographic 
limitation.32 Regardless of debates over its coverage, whether the target 
 
 25. See Estate of Thompson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 291 F.R.D. 297, 303–06 (N.D. 
Iowa 2013) (canvassing divide). 
 26. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 92 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(4); see Marlboro Prod. Corp. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 55 F.R.D. 487, 
489 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (concluding that “experimentation with the newly authorized procedure should be 
encouraged rather than blocked”), quoted in Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
 28. Estate of Gerasimenko v. Cape Wind Trading Co., 272 F.R.D. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 29. SEC v. Banc de Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *8, 
2014 WL 1030862, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2014)  (citing 8A WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2112 (2010)); accord, e.g., Cassidy v. Teaching Co., LLC, No. 2:13-CV-
884, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123413, at *3, 2014 WL 4377843 , at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2014); Lord v. 
Flanagan, No. CV 13-26-BU-DLC-JCL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1687, at *3–4, 2014 WL 51655, at *2 
(D. Mont. Jan. 7, 2014); DeGeer v. Gillis, No. 09 C 6974, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97457, at *4, 2010 
WL 3732132, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2010). 
 30. Hasbro, Inc. v. Serafino, 168 F.R.D. 99, 100 (D. Mass. 1996); accord, e.g., Renewable Res. 
Coalition, Inc. v. Kaplan (In re Robert Leonard Kaplan), No. 2:11-bk-60249-RK, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 
2390, at *5, 2013 WL 2897766, at *1 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 12, 2013). By definition, a “subpoena” is 
“a writ or order commanding a person to appear before a court or other tribunal, subject to a penalty for 
failing to comply.” Subpoena, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 31. Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d 248, 256–57 (D.C. Cir. 2006); First City, Tex.-Houston, N.A. 
v. Rafidain Bank, 197 F.R.D. 250, 254 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 32. See Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(deeming the geographic limitations of Rule 45(e) to be equally applicable to parties and non-parties); 
Racher v. Lusk, No. CIV-13-665-M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1160, at *5, 2016 WL 67799, at *2 (W.D. 
6
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is a party or a non-party, “[a] subpoena may be served at any place 
within the United States” under Rule 45(b)(2).33 Once served, a failure 
to comply may render that recalcitrant person liable for contempt of 
court.34 Still, as a practical matter, a subpoena issued upon express order 
of a judge and one by a clerk tend to elicit different juridical treatment.35 
In short, “[f]acilitating service of process on managing agents of foreign 
corporations [or any foreign person] is not a legitimate reason to compel 
deponents to appear in . . . [a specific U.S. jurisdiction], as this is not the 
function of Rules 30(a)(1) or (b)(6)”; for such situations, “the carefully 
crafted procedures of Rule 45” control.36 
In contrast, Section 1783 of the twenty-eighth title of the United 
States Code (“Code”), also known as the Walsh Act,37 “governs issuing 
and serving a subpoena directed to a United States national or resident 
who is in a foreign country,”38 classes explicitly broader than the term 
“United States citizen.”39 Seemingly, Congress did not intend this 
provision to apply in connection with any foreign proceedings.40 Rather, 
this statute “was enacted in 1926 in order to compel Americans living 
abroad to return to the United States to testify at a trial in a criminal case 
[and, after 1964, a civil case], if the testimony was deemed by the court 
 
Okla. Jan. 5, 2016) (noting that the geographic limitation of Rule 45 does not apply to the depositions of 
parties). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2); Osgood v. Disc. Auto Parts, LLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1265 (S.D. 
Fla. 2013). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(f)–(g); see also, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Rhb 
Installations, Inc., No. CV 12-2981 (JS)(ARL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4266, at *4, 2016 WL 128153, at 
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016) (“If a commanded party ‘fails without adequate excuse to obey the 
subpoena,’ the court may hold that party in contempt.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 45(g))); Calabro v. 
Stone, 224 F.R.D. 532, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Absent an improperly issued subpoena or an ‘adequate 
excuse’ by the non-party, failure to comply with a subpoena made under Rule 45 may be deemed a 
contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued.”); Daval Steel Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 
F.2d 1357, 1364 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] valid subpoena is a legal instrument, non-compliance with which 
can constitute contempt of court.”). 
 35. See Recording Indus. of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc. (In re Verizon Internet Servs., 
Inc.), 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[I]n the Rule 45 context, courts recognize that a 
subpoena issued upon express order of a judge and a subpoena issued by the clerk of the court are not 
equivalent.”).  
 36. In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 474 (E.D. Va. 2010).   
 37. Act of July 3, 1926, 44 Stat. 83 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1783); see Blackmer v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 433–35 n.1, 52 S. Ct. 252, 76 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1932) (discussing this original 
version). 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1783. A separate section within the same chapter of the 
Code controls discovery from United States residents or those individuals found in the United States for 
use in foreign tribunals. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). In this article, any references to “Section 1782” or “§ 
1782,” and to “Section 1783” or “§ 1783,” are to the sections cited in this footnote, as codified within 
the Code’s twenty-eighth title, unless otherwise noted. 
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2014).  
 40. In re Oxus Gold PLC, No. 06-82–GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24061, at *25, 2007 WL 
1037387, at *9 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007). 
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issuing the subpoena to be of sufficient importance.”41 Whatever its 
precise purpose, before a court may order the appearance of United 
States citizens residing in foreign countries as witnesses in a deposition, 
Section 1783 requires that it find (1) “that particular testimony or the 
production of the document or other thing by him is necessary in the 
interest of justice” and (2) “that it is not possible to obtain his [or her] 
testimony in admissible form without his [or her] personal appearance or 
to obtain the production of the document or other thing in any other 
manner.”42 For all their apparent clarity, much ambiguity enshrouds 
these operative criteria as to this “extraordinary subpoena power.”43  
The subject of a “surprising shortage of pertinent case law,” the 
“interest of justice” prong is normally “considered in light of the 
circumstances of the particular case and, more importantly, the posture 
of the case when the issue arises.”44 In the eyes of most courts, this bar 
is met only upon proof of one or more “compelling reason[s].”45 By no 
means binding, and oddly never included within its body, this statute’s 
legislative history offers up “a multiple of factors,”46 including “the 
nature of the proceedings, the nature of the testimony or evidence 
sought, the convenience of the witness or the producer of the evidence, 
the convenience of the parties, and other facts bearing upon the 
reasonableness of requiring a person abroad to appear as a witness.”47 In 
fact, some courts have often classified “the predicate theory of federal 
pre-trial discovery,” i.e. “the production of relevant material essential 
for the full and fair litigation of a cause of action,” as one such pertinent 
justification.48 Effectively concocting a quasi-standard, a handful of 
courts have held testimony to be “necessary in the interest of justice” 
under Section 1783 by virtue of its satisfaction of the liberal relevancy 
standard implanted within Rule 26(b).49  
 
 41. SEC v. Sabhlok, No. 08 Civ. 4238, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105194, at *13, 2009 WL 
3561523, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a); Air Turbine Tech., Inc. v. Atlas Copco AB, 217 F.R.D. 545, 546 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003). 
 43. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 10 (1964). 
 44. Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 412 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting 
Klesch & Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 217 F.R.D. 517, 523 (D. Colo. 2003)); see also, e.g., In re 
Petrobras Secs. Litig., No. 14-cv-9662 (JSR), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30469, at *6–8, 2016 WL 908644, 
at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2016) (applying this totality of circumstances test). 
 45. Ungar, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 333–34(quoting Klesch & Co., 217 F.R.D. at 523); see also Balk 
v. N.Y. Inst. of Tech., 974 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying Walsh Act). 
 46. Ungar, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 334. 
 47. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 10. 
 48. Klesch & Co., 217 F.R.D. at 524; see also, e.g., Costello v. Poisella, 291 F.R.D. 224, 230 
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (observing that the court’s authority to manage and oversee the discovery process 
extends beyond information acquired through formal discovery and allows it to restrict a party’s use of 
the Rules’ subpoena provision). 
 49. See, e.g., SEC v. Sabhlok, No. 08 Civ. 4238, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105194, at *8, 2009 WL 
8
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The second prong, in turn, has been even less frequently explicated. 
The few courts forced to assess this second requirement look to whether 
the information sought from the relevant witness can be practically 
obtained.50 Thus, “[s]ubpoenas may be issued when it is ‘impractical’ to 
obtain the information.”51 To some, it can be met by showing that the 
deponent offers “a unique source of evidence . . . not previously 
provided,”52 or “where resort to alternative methods is unlikely to 
produce the relevant evidence in time to meet impending discovery 
deadlines.”53 As another court opined, “[i]mpracticality occurs . . . 
where resort to alternative methods is unlikely to produce the relevant 
evidence in time to meet impending discovery deadlines.”54 Whatever 
the standard’s functional denotation, sheer impossibility is not 
necessary,55 and “generalized and speculative concern[s]” about possible 
“hardship” will never suffice.56   
Several limits attach to any subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 45(b)(2) 
or (b)(3). Most importantly, such a directive may command a person to 
attend a deposition in only two places: (1) “within 100 miles of where 
the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in 
person,” or (2) “within the state where the person resides, is employed, 
or regularly transacts business in person” if that person is either “a party 
or a party’s officer” or “is command to attend a trial and would not incur 
substantial expense.”57 In practice, Rule 45 compels a court to “quash 
any subpoena that calls for a deposition beyond the 100 mile limit for 
non-party witness.”58 This atextual construction draws its justification 
from Rule 45’s reputed ends: “to protect such witnesses from being 
subjected to excessive discovery burdens in litigation in which they have 
little or no interest.”59 In addition, the resulting subpoena must be served 
 
3561523, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009) (citing SEC v. Sandifur, No. C05-1631C, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 89428, at *11, 2006 WL 3692611, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2006)); cf. Klesch, 217 F.R.D. at 
523 (so concluding, partly on the basis of the belief “that the discovery procedures in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedures seek to further the interests of justice by minimizing surprise at trial and ensuring 
wide-ranging discovery of information”).  
 50. Balk, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 156. 
 51. Sandifur, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89428, at *13, 2006 WL 3692611, at *4. 
 52. Sabhlok, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105194, at *11, 2009 WL 3561523, at *4. 
 53. Sandifur, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89428, at *13, 2006 WL 3692611, at *4. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Safar v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 1:15cv469, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52404, at *5, 2016 
WL 1589600, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2016) (citing Balk, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 156). 
 56. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opp. Comm’n v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. 11-00257 DAE-RLP, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33346, at *15–16, 2012 WL 874868, at *5 (D. Haw. Mar. 13, 2012).   
 57. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
 58. State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Camden, Civ. No. 08-5128 (NLH) (AMD), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 65142, at *7–8, 2010 WL 2719810, at *2 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010). 
 59. Edelman v. Taittinger (In re Edelman), 295 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., 
M’Baye v. N.J. Sports Prod., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 205, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting case and emphasizing 
9
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in accordance with the Rules, and the serving party must always pay any 
witness’ travel costs, as calculated by the relevant tribunal.60 Lastly, as 
courts have overwhelmingly ruled, “[t]he only people who cannot be 
served under . . . [this statute] are foreign nationals residing in a foreign 
country.”61  
3. Limits on Distant Depositions: Rule 28 
If a deposition is to be held abroad, whether physically or via 
teleconference, Rule 28(b) must be consulted.62 In accordance with its 
language, a deposition in a foreign court will only be permitted (1) 
“under a treaty or convention,” (2) “under a letter of request, whether or 
not captioned a ‘letter of rogatory,’” (3) “on notice, before a person 
authorized to administer oaths either by federal law or by the law in the 
place of examination,” or finally (4) “before a person commissioned by 
the court to administer any necessary oath and take testimony.”63 The 
burden for getting such an order lies upon the party opposing the 
location selected by another or preferred by a court.64 For this very 
reason, one court admonished a party for “mak[ing] no attempt to 
analyze which, if any, of the circumstances [enumerated in Rule 28(b)] 
is applicable” and thereupon denied without prejudice a motion to 
depose by videoconference under Rule 30, a denial to be reconsidered if 
the requesting party would “supplement its request with proposed 
procedures that would ensure that the requirements of Rule 28(b) . . . 
[can be] satisfied.”65 Before allowing or ordering a deposition to be 
hosted abroad to occur pursuant to Rule 28, courts focus on a variety of 
“logistical” factors, regularly compelling the party whose witness is to 
be deposed to (1) provide documentation that the foreign nation’s 
government permits such depositions to proceed on its own soil or does 
not expressly foreclose their conduct; (2) identify and secure one or 
more officials who are authorized to administer an oath at the 
prospective location; (3) set forth dates, times, and locations of any 
 
the plain language of Rule 45). 
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(b). 
 61. NML Capital Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., No. 2:14-cv-492-RFB-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
110625, at *29, 2014 WL 3898021, at *9 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2014) (citing, among others, Relational, 
LLC v. Hodges, 627 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1553 
(11th Cir. 1993)). 
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b); Zassenhaus v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 404 F.2d 1361, 1362 n.1 
(D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b)(1)(A)–(D); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 
1134, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 64. See Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 427, 430–31 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 65. Menovcik v. BASF Corp., No. 09-12096, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123858, at *12, *15–16, 
2010 WL 4867408, at *4, *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2010). 
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foreign deposition promptly; (4) arrange high-resolution cameras/videos 
offering a full view of both the deponent and his or her immediate 
surroundings if the deposition is to be taken via live video; and/or (5) 
identify any and all interpreters, stenographers, and, if necessary, 
videographers to be involved.66  
4. Discovery’s Purpose: Rules 1 and 26 
The Rules’ first paragraph delineates their scope and purpose, thus 
influencing the interpretation of every other rule—and much of the 
judiciary’s treatment of any procedural ambiguity.  
Pursuant to its first sentence, “the [R]ules govern the procedure in all 
civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except 
as stated in Rule 81.”67 Rule 1’s second independent clause sets out the 
three principles intended to guide every rule’s construction: “[The 
Rules] should be construed, administered, and employed by the court 
and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action and proceeding.”68 In 1993, the advisory committee 
added “and administered” so as to “to recognize the affirmative duty of 
the court to exercise the authority conferred by the[ R]ules to ensure that 
civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or 
delay.”69 Attorneys “share this responsibility with the judge to whom the 
case is assigned,” and even the most partisan lawyer must not forget that 
“[e]ffective advocacy is consistent with—and indeed depends upon—
cooperative and proportional use of procedure.”70 The addition of 
“employed” on December 1, 2015, extended this obligation to one final 
group—the parties themselves.71 As such, every rule, including Rules 28 
and 30, must be construed in a manner most likely to ensure realization 
of the three virtues—justice, speed, and efficiency—consecrated in Rule 
1.72  
 
 66. United States v. Cordoba, No. 12-20157-CR-ROSENBAUM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46804, 
at *11–12, 2013 WL 1325302, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2013) (listing these conditions). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; United States v. Perez, 752 F.3d 398, 404 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 69. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; see also, e.g., In re Cooper 
Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; Paul v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:14-cv-1382, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143935, at *11–12, 2015 WL 6134104, at *4 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2015); Navico, Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. 14-cv-303-CVE-TLW, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 160036, at *15, 2015 WL 7721218, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 30, 2015). 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 72. See, e.g., Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. U.S. Distilled Prods. Co., 952 F.2d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“Rule 1 sets the policy for construing all of these rules.”); United States v. Hoffa, 497 F.2d 294, 
296 (7th Cir. 1974) (“All of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) 
relating to costs, must be interpreted in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.”); Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 
11
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Establishing the Rules’ “pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism,”73 
two subsections relevant to Rule 30’s explication appear in Rule 26. 
Above all, Rule 26(b)(1) promulgates discovery’s uniquely minimalistic 
relevance standard: “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” 
with a court empowered to order “discovery of any matter relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the action” upon a showing of “good 
cause.”74 At the same time, Rule 26(b)(1) obviates any link between 
relevance for purposes of discovery and admissibility and thus impliedly 
bars the derivation of any such conflated standard: “[i]nformation within 
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be 
discoverable.”75 As drafted and construed, Rule 26(b)(1)’s 
discoverability criteria do (and should) influence the location of all 
depositions.76 In its current form, moreover, Rule 26(b)(1) does one 
thing more. Simply put, it subjects “[a]ll discovery” to limitations 
imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).77 Any evidentiary material’s 
discoverability therefore depends upon its “proportional[ity] to the needs 
of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the 
action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”78 Due to this reconfiguration, 
several constraints—(1) “the discovery sought is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source 
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”; (2) “the 
 
124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[T]he Rules were intended to embody a unitary concept of efficient and 
meaningful judicial procedure, and that no single Rule can consequently be considered in a vacuum.”); 
cf. Amir Shachmurove, Sovereign Speech in Troubled Times: Prosecutorial Statements as Extrajudicial 
Admissions, 86 TENN. L REV. 401, 427–31 (2019) (discussing these values’ roles beyond just the Rules’ 
purview). 
 73. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500, 67 S. Ct. 385, 392, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947). 
 74. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Parnon 
Energy, Inc., 593 F. App’x 32, 36 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Relevance to the subject matter under Rule 26 is 
construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter 
that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2389, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978))). 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Anderson v. Marsh, No. 1:14-cv-01599-TLN-SAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 169071, at *3, 2015 WL 9179361, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2015) (citing new rule). 
 76. Bell v. Bd. of Educ., 225 F.R.D. 186, 193 (S.D. W. Va. 2004); cf., e.g., Credit Lyonnais, S.A. 
v. SGC Int’l, Inc., 160 F.3d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The rules for depositions and discovery are to be 
accorded a broad and liberal treatment”); Pucket v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572, 
579–80 (D.S.D. 2006) (invoking Rule in analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 501). 
 77. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also, e.g., Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 49 F. Supp. 3d 
545, 562 (N.D. Iowa 2014); Colaco v. ASIC Advantage Simplified Pension Plan, 301 F.R.D. 431, 434 
n.21 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 78. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Booth v. City of Dallas, No. 3:15-cv-2435-P, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 169225, at *4, 2015 WL 9259060, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2015) (quoting new rule). 
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party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the 
information by discovery in the action”; or (3) “the burden or expense of 
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the 
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues”79—merit careful consideration if a 
potential deponent chooses to contest a deposition notice or subpoena.80 
Even absent such evidenced opposition, courts may invoke Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) sua sponte,81 an analysis necessarily incorporating Rule 
26(b)(1)’s two standards.82  
One more paragraph enjoys a starring role in the judicial struggles 
over the pegging of a prospective deposition’s appropriate location. 
Specifically, Rule 26(c) vests a court with the prerogative to issue an 
order, “for good cause,” protecting a “party or person” from 
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”83 
Relying upon this subparagraph, multiple jurists have maintained that 
“[a] district court has wide discretion to establish the time and place of 
depositions.”84 After all, this rule provides for protective orders 
precisely so as to circumscribe “‘the extensive intrusion into the affairs 
of both litigants and third parties’ that is both permissible and common 
in modern discovery.”85 Recent amendments to the Rules, all animated 
by a desire to place some definite limits on sprawling discovery, only 
underscore the judiciary’s obligation to diligently, albeit reasonably, 
exercise the discretion already afforded by Rule 26(b) and (c).  
 
 79. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C); Surles v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
 80. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 30(d)(3)(B); see also, e.g., Kiln Underwriting, Ltd. v. Jesuit High 
Sch. of New Orleans, Nos. 05-04350, 06-05060, 06-05057, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83535, at *4–6, 
2008 WL 4286491, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 18, 2008). 
 81. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (requiring a court to “limit the frequency or extent of discovery” 
whether on “motion or on its own”); Rich v. Shrader, No. 09-CV-0652-AJB (BGS), 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 98184, at *15, 2013 WL 3710806, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2013). 
 82. See Charvat v. Travel Servs., No. 12-cv-05746, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81770, at *7, 2015 
WL 3917046, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2015) (contending that, in part due to Rule 26(b)(2)(C), “a court 
is not merely permitted to limit discovery of information it finds to be irrelevant, [as defined in Rule 
26(b)(1)], it is required to do so”). 
 83. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (emphasis added); Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1067 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
 84. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., SEC v. Banc de 
Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *8, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 14, 2014); Turner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 119 F.R.D. 381, 383 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Leist v. 
Union Oil Co., 82 F.R.D. 203, 204 (E.D. Wis. 1979). 
 85. Bond, 585 F.3d at 1067 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30, 104 S. Ct. 
2199, 2206, 81 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1984)). 
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5. Summary: Deriving Guidance from the Rules’ Written Commands 
Having wandered through a textual thicket, two conclusions can be 
distilled. First, the prohibition in Rule 26(c) and the limitation set forth 
in Rule 45(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B) serve to delimitate any federal court’s 
authority to compel depositions of out-of-state witnesses in practice, if 
not by rule.86 Indeed, though it does not appear in the written text of 
Rule 30, the requirements embedded in Rule 45(c)(1) have tellingly 
been extended to noticed depositions, with courts utilizing Rules 1 and 
26(c) as the gateways. Conversely, some tribunals have dispensed with 
it when the particular request appears meritorious, a sufficient nexus 
exists, the judicial process has already been disrupted, and a stipulation 
to mitigate costs has been entered.87 Second, while notice that complies 
with Rule 30(a)(1) will suffice per Rule 28(b)(1)(C), before a court 
orders the holding of a foreign deposition pursuant to the latter, it will 
need to ascertain whether one of the four conditions in Rule 28(b)(1) can 
be satisfied and whether another nation-state’s law even permits the 
holding of a deposition authorized by a United States tribunal on its own 
soil, a question that may (or may not) depend upon the citizenship of the 
potential deponent.  
C. Mutually Hostile Presumptions 
In addition to the foregoing restrictions, a rebuttable presumption has 
gained a foothold, its imprint now contracting, over the last twenty-five 
years. As one court précised it, “a corporation’s deposition should be 
taken at the corporation’s [principal] place of business.”88 Formally, 
though this principle extends to officers, directors, and managing agents 
of that corporation,89 much case law hints at a broader application. To 
wit, for countless courts, any defendant, natural or artificial, must be 
examined at his residence or place of business or employment unless 
this presumption has been decidedly rebutted.90 As logic foretells, 
“[w]hen a foreign defendant is involved, this presumption may be even 
 
 86. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c), 45(c)(1)(A)–(B); In re Guthrie, 733 F.2d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 87. NML Capital Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., No. 2:14-cv-492-RFB-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
110625, at *37, 2014 WL 3898021, at *12 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2014). 
 88. Banc de Binary, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *8–9, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3; accord, 
e.g., St. Hillaire & Assocs. v. F.D.I.C., Civ. No. 92-511-SD, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14839, at *3–4, 
1994 WL 575773, at *2 (D.N.H. Oct. 13, 1994); Mill-Run Tours, Inc. v. Khashoggi, 124 F.R.D. 547, 
550 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 89. Armsey v. Medshares Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 569, 571 (W.D. Va. 1998). 
 90. E.g., Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 427, 429 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Farquhar v. 
Shelden, 116 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
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stronger.”91 Accordingly, subject to only extraordinary circumstances, 
not just corporate designees but any defendant can only be deposed at 
either his or her employer’s principal place of business or established 
residence,92 this rule trumpeting plaintiff’s normally unfettered right to 
pick a deposition’s location.  
Whatever the setting, this axiom is based on “the concept that it is the 
plaintiffs who bring the lawsuit and who exercise the first choice as to 
the forum” and “[t]he defendants, on the other hand, are not before the 
court by choice.”93 As the Court itself has warned, “American courts, in 
supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise special vigilance to 
protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or unduly 
burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position,” 
with judges expected to pay “the most careful consideration” of 
“objections to ‘abusive’ discovery” and to acknowledge “the special 
demands of comity” when dealing with “a foreign litigant on account of 
its nationality or the location of its operations.”94 Notably, much ink has 
been spilled over the extent of this “general proposition.”95  
Complicating matters, a countervailing tendency can be glimpsed 
within a hodgepodge of cases, as corporate defendants are, in fact, 
commonly deposed in places other than the location of the principal 
place of business, especially in the forum where the action is pending.96 
Mostly, courts give two justifications for this increasingly common 
approach: (1) “the convenience of all parties” and (2) “the general 
interests of judicial economy.”97 Another concern—“[i]f a federal court 
 
 91. Banc de Binary, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *9, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3 (relying on 
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546, 107 
S. Ct. 2542, 2556, 96 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1987)). 
 92.  Fausto, 251 F.R.D. at 429; see also, e.g., Fernandez v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P., No. 
2:12-cv-00295-JCM-GWF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14786, at *4, 2013 WL 438669, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 
1, 2013) (citing Fausto, 251 F.R.D. at 429). 
 93. Doe v. Karadzic, Nos. 93 Civ. 878, 93 Civ. 1163, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at *9, 1997 
WL 45515, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Farquhar, 116 
F.R.D. at 72). 
 94. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546. 
 95. Doe, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at *8, 1997 WL 45515, at *3; see also, e.g., Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Co. v. La Antillana, S.A., No. 88 Civ. 2670, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13246, at *2–4, 1990 WL 
155727, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1990); Deep S. Oil Co. of Tex. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 21 F.R.D. 340, 
342 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
 96. United States v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Displaying Tail No. VPCES, 304 F.R.D. 10, 14 
(D.D.C. 2014); Trs. of the Local 813 Ins. Tr. Fund v. Indus. Recycling Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV-1522, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167566, at *5, 2013 WL 6178579, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2013); Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784(WHP), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80905, at *10–11, 2012 WL 
2108220, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012); see also, e.g., Toyota Motor Corp. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cty., 
130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 146–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that “foreign corporation[s][’] agents are 
frequently compelled for deposition on American soil” under federal law and that “[v]arious state courts 
likewise have ordered foreign nationals to attend depositions in this country”). 
 97. Sugarhill Records Ltd. v. Motown Record Corp., 105 F.R.D. 166, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), cited 
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compels discovery on foreign soil, foreign judicial sovereignty may be 
infringed, but when depositions of foreign nationals are taken on 
American or neutral soil . . . comity concerns are not implicated”—has 
also been cited as a defense.98 For these very reasons, a foreign 
corporation subject to a United States court’s in personam jurisdiction 
can be—and have been—ordered under Rule 30(b)(6) to produce its 
officers, directors, or managing agents in the United States to give 
deposition testimony.99 In such situations, federal courts almost 
invariably select an American city, i.e. Washington or New York for 
European deponents.100  
In short, in the case of a corporation’s deposition under Rule 30(b)(6), 
two presumptions, subject to endless adjustments, persist. Often cited, of 
course, is the “presumption” that the deposition of a corporation’s 
agents and officers should ordinarily be taken at the company’s principal 
place of business.101 When the corporation is a defendant, this 
postulate’s cogency only grows.102 In line with this understanding, as 
much case law declares, good cause for a protective order cannot be 
established simply by arguing that it would be burdensome to travel to a 
foreign country and/or because the deponent is a busy executive.103 In 
truth, however, federal courts actually accord “varying degrees of 
deference” to this so-called “presumption.”104 As one explained, it can 
be readily overcome by showing that “peculiar” circumstances favor 
depositions at a different location or factors of cost, convenience, and 
litigation efficiency favor holding the deposition outside of the witness’ 
district.105 The presumption loses further force in cases where a plaintiff 
 
in Custom Form Mfg., Inc. v. Omron Corp., 196 F.R.D. 333, 338 (N.D. Ind. 2000). 
 98. In re Honda Am. Motor Co., Inc. Dealership Relations Litig., 168 F.R.D. 535, 538 (D. Md. 
1996) (citing numerous cases, including In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 608 n.13 (5th Cir. 
1985)). 
 99. Custom Form Mfg., Inc., 196 F.R.D. at 336 (collecting cases, including In re Honda Am. 
Motor Co., Inc. Dealership Relations Litig., 168 F.R.D. at 541–42; M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GMBH 
& Co., 165 F.R.D. 65, 68 (E.D. Mich. 1996); and Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430, 439–40 (N.D. Cal. 
1990)); Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 1985) (emphasis added). 
 100. See SEC v. Banc de Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at 
*13–30, 2014 WL 1030862, at *4–8 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2014); New Medium Techs. LLC v. Barco N.V., 
242 F.R.D. 460, 469 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 101. Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. Masco Corp. of Ind., 871 F.2d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 1989); Chris-Craft 
Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Kuraray Co., Ltd., 184 F.R.D. 605, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 102. Zuckert v. Berkliff Corp., 96 F.R.D. 161, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
 103. E.g., Motion Games, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., No. 6:12-cv-878-JDL, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 147853, at *13, 2014 WL 5306961, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2014); Invensas Corp. v. Renesas 
Elecs. Corp., No. CA 11-448-GMS-CJB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92455, at *10, 2012 WL 2501106, at 
*3–4 (D. Del. June 27, 2012). 
 104. New Medium Techs., LLC, 242 F.R.D. at 466. 
 105. Six W. Retail Acquisition v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., 203 F.R.D. 98, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001); see also, e.g., Doe, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at *10–11, 1997 WL 45515, at *3–4. 
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chose the relevant forum as a result of unavoidable and strict 
constraints.106 And “[w]here the factual premise is attenuated, the 
presumption is weakest.”107 Riddled with such exceptions, the 
“presumption” that a defendant or non-party witness will be deposed in 
the district where the deponent resides or has a principal place of 
business has been described as “the antithesis of [one].”108  
D. Regnant Tests 
If “no place . . . appears convenient for the parties,” the deposition’s 
location must be decided.109 Axiomatically, courts have wide discretion 
in determining the appropriate place and may attach any number of 
conditions, including payment of expenses.110 When making the 
foregoing determinations, courts attempt to ascertain whether 
“circumstances exist distinguishing the [present] case from the ordinary 
run of civil cases.”111 Typically, these tribunals employ the five-factor 
test famously limned in Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp.: “(1) the 
location of counsel for the parties in the forum district; (2) the number 
of corporate representatives a party is seeking to depose; (3) the 
likelihood of significant discovery disputes arising which would 
necessitate resolution by the forum court; (4) whether the persons sought 
to be deposed often engage in travel for business purposes; and (5) the 
equities with regard to the nature of the claim and the parties’ 
relationship.”112 Separately from and additionally to this quintet, courts 
tend to weigh (6) its own “ability to supervise depositions and resolve 
discovery dispute[s],”113 and (7) “whether the [proposed] deposition 
would be impeded by the foreign nation’s laws or would affront the 
nation’s judicial sovereignty,”114 an analysis substantively identical to 
 
 106. Devlin v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, Nos. 95 Civ. 0742 (JFK) (JCF), 95 Civ. 10838 
(JFK) (JCF), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 264, at *8–9, 2000 WL 28173, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2000). 
 107. Mill-Run Tours, Inc. v. Khashoggi, 124 F.R.D. 547, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 108. New Medium Techs., LLC, 242 F.R.D. at 466. 
 109. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 
522, 546, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2556, 96 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1987). 
 110. Sacramento E.D.M., Inc. v. Hynes Aviation Indus., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-0288 MCE KJN, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126922, at *2–3, 2014 WL 4471419, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2014) (collecting 
cases). 
 111. In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 472 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 112. 232 F.R.D. 625, 629 (C.D. Cal. 2005); accord, e.g., Banc de Binary, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34373, at *10 & n.8, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3 & n.8 (describing the Cadent factors as the default rule in 
the Ninth Circuit and noting that other circuits use similar tests); Armsey v. Medshares Mgmt. Servs., 
Inc., 184 F.R.D. 569, 571 (W.D. Va. 1998) (citing the same five factors, occasionally branded the 
“Armsey factors”). 
 113. Afram Exp. Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1365 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 114. Custom Form Mfg., Inc. v. Omron Corp., 196 F.R.D. 333, 336 (N.D. Ind. 2000). 
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that impliedly mandated by Rule 28(b). 
Relevant to the Cadent test and its iterations is Rule 30: “[t]he parties 
may stipulate—or the court may on motion order—that a deposition be 
taken by telephone or other remote means,”115 with the Rule read to 
mean that a deposition is “taken” where the deponent is physically 
located regardless of the means by which he or she is being queried—as 
well as a federal court’s power to authorize use of alternate discovery 
methods, “such as the use of written questions,” so as to minimize any 
number of difficulties.116 Thus, courts have repeatedly ordered 
individuals located abroad to be deposed by video conference under 
Rule 30,117 partly impelled by the Cadent tests’ stress on circumstantial 
equities and driven by the desire to encourage parties to make use of 
technology to limit costs whenever feasible.118 With just as much 
unflagging faithfulness, they have made clear that the constrictions 
applicable under Rule 28(b) must still be adhered if the deponent is 
located outside the specific forum.119 
E. Distillation 
As noted above, Rule 30, particularly paragraph (a)(1), sets forth the 
governing standard for fixing a deposition’s site. Notably, “[t]he 
deponent’s attendance may be compelled by subpoena under Rule 45,” 
whether or not the deponent is a party.120 However, “[a] deposition 
notice is all that is needed to require the attendance of parties at their 
depositions.”121 In contrast, a subpoena must only be “served on a non-
party to compel attendance at the taking of a deposition.”122 Admittedly, 
 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(4). 
 116. Wis. Real Estate Inv. Tr. v. Weinstein, 530 F. Supp. 1249, 1254 (E.D. Wis. 1982). 
 117. See, e.g., Yowie N. Am., Inc., No. 13-CV-1906 BEN (JMA), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
163127, at *6, 2013 WL 6061945, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (citing cases so ordering); United 
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 99-2496, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24551, 2004 WL 3253681 
(D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004); UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 31, 2006 WL 
375433 (Del. Chanc. Feb. 9, 2006). 
 118. See Guillen v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 10-05825, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97966, at *2, 2011 
WL 3939690, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011). 
 119. See, e.g., Angamarca v. Da Ciro, Inc., 303 F.R.D. 445, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Am. Nat’l Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Mirasco, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 240, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 120. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1). 
 121. United States v. $ 160,066.98 from Bank of Am., 202 F.R.D. 624, 627 (S.D. Cal. 2001); see 
also, e.g., Calderon v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 629, 631 (D. Idaho 2012) (“It is, of 
course, black letter law that only a party to a lawsuit may be deposed pursuant to notice as opposed to 
subpoena.”). 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s note to 1971 amendment (emphasis added); see 
also, e.g., Lehman v. Kornblau, 206 F.R.D. 345, (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Discovery of non-parties must be 
conducted by subpoena pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, not the rules governing discovery of parties.”); cf. 
Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (concluding that once a non-party is 
18
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Rule 45, expressly applicable only if subpoenas must be or are actually 
used, contains the 100-mile limitation.123 Despite this fact, however, 
courts have used the 100-mile limitation in evaluating where a 
deposition of a non-party should be located, frequently construing 
anything more than 100 miles to be a “substantial burden” that 
reinforces the classic presumptions précised below. More significantly, 
Rule 26(c)(2) and the Cadent factors, numbering anywhere from four to 
seven124 or even eight,125 can be, and have been, invoked to modify 
these same presumption(s).126 Perhaps unsurprisingly, “[c]ost 
considerations related to the location of depositions” should be “viewed 
through at least two lenses: the relative ability of the parties to bear the 
expense of depositions in a given location, and the effect that the choice 
of location will have upon the total costs of litigation.”127 In the end, a 
court128 “must consider each case on its own facts and the equities of the 
particular situation,”129 and always retains “wide discretion to establish 
the time and place of depositions”130 in the interest of justice and 
procedural equity.131 Regardless, court and party would be well-served 
by beginning with the checklists included in this article’s appendix, 
matched to both the relevant rules and the regnant precedent.  
III. CONCLUSION 
In legal and colloquial discourse, words like “reasonable” and 
 
served in accordance with Rule 45, it is under the same obligation that would be conferred on a party to 
whom request is addressed pursuant to Rule 30). 
 123. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(C)(1)(A). 
 124. Sacramento E.D.M., Inc. v. Hynes Aviation Indus., No. 2:13-cv-0288 MCE KJN, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 126922, at *4, 2014 WL 4471419, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2014); see also, e.g., Clean 
Air Council v. Dragon Int’l Grp., No. 1:CV-06-0430, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89565, at *3–4, 2007 WL 
4276532, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2007) (identifying many factors, though emphasizing the significance 
of “hardship to the parties”). 
 125. In re Honda Am. Motor Co., Inc. Dealership Relations Litig., 168 F.R.D. 535, 538 (D. Md. 
1996). 
 126. E.g., Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. NovaStar Fin., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31-32 (D. 
D.C. 2009); Turner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 119 F.R.D. 381, 383 (M.D.N.C. 1988). 
 127. Dagen v. CFC Grp. Holdings Ltd., No. 00 Civ. 5682 (CBM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13859, 
at *8, 2003 WL 21910861, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2003). 
 128. Logically, this case law draws no distinction between magistrate and district court judges. S. 
Seas Catamaran, Inc. v. The Motor Vessel “Leeway”, 120 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D.N.J. 1988).  
 129. Turner, 119 F.R.D. at 383. 
 130. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 131. See Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 347, 54 S. Ct. 735, 737, 78 L. Ed. 1298 (1934) 
(observing that the traditional powers of the courts at equity, as codified in Rule 27(a), date from even 
before the adoption of the Constitution); cf. In re Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d 625, 628 (10th Cir. 
1987) (“The trial court has great discretion in establishing the time and place of a deposition.”); Custom 
Form Mfg., Inc. v. Omron Corp., 196 F.R.D. 333, 336 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (quoting In re Standard Metals 
Corp., 817 F.2d at 628). 
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“cause” imply an award of discretion. Where little definitive direction 
jumps from the pertinent texts, and courts must instead rely on 
contextual extrapolation, that freedom increases exponentially. Within 
the world of federal procedure, the complicated calculus involved in 
determining the situs of any deposition is but one more demonstration of 
this old truth. Of course, where a deponent opts not to contest another’s 
choice, a party’s pick poses no problems, but where objection is lodged, 
parties and courts alike must wander into a wild terrain. There, the Rules 
give some aid; there, presumptions duel; there, such fluid phrases as 
“cost, convenience, and litigation efficiency” get tossed around, jumping 
from motion to motion and from decision to decision, like demented 
ions. That some coherence can be artificially concocted by diligent 
readers does not change the threats to clarity and certainty posed by ill-
defined rules and sloppy ratiocination. Perhaps, then, the time has come 
to finally input a definite standard for this unmathematical assay into 
Rule 30(b)’s sphinxlike decree, one akin to that now encoded in Rule 
26(b)(1). Otherwise, bitter controversy will continue, and discretion, for 
good and ill, will litter this peculiarly vacant procedural field with 
almost surely incompatible curiosities.132 While Congress may have 
“given the responsibilities for filling in the details of common law 
statutes” to the courts,133 such vacuums can sometimes undermine the 




 132. Indeed, even if globalization’s allure has waned, to allow this emptiness to continue is to 
invite far more risks to international comity and procedural coherence than a definite touchstone would 
foster. Cf. Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 294 (1993) (describing the dangers of certain discretionary terms to the 
predictability of bankruptcy jurisprudence).  
 133. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1377–78 
(1988). 
 134. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (“Stability and 
predictability are essential factors in the proper operation of the rule of law.”); cf. Jerome B. Grubart, 
Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547, 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1055, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1024 
(1995) (rejecting a complex test that would “jettison[] relative predictability for the open-ended rough-
and-tumble of factors that assures complex argument[s] in [the] trial court and . . . virtually inevitable 
appeal” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
1 _____ (a) Party . . . 
who . . . 
Different presumptions apply depending on 
whether the deponent party is a plaintiff or a 
defendant. Generally, a natural plaintiff must 
make himself/herself available for 
examination in the forum in which the suit 
was brought.135 Conversely, an initial 
presumption exists that a natural defendant 
should be deposed in the district of his 
residence or principal place of business.136 
Eminent good sense underlies these dueling 
presumptions: “[b]ecause the plaintiff often 
chooses the forum, he will more likely be 
required to attend his deposition when set in 
the forum district,” but “[a] defendant . . . does 
not choose the forum.”137 
 
However, where the forum court has 
jurisdiction and the potential deponent is a 
party to the action and resides in the forum, 
the examining party is often free to 
“unilaterally choose a deposition’s location,” 
_____ (b) lives less 
100 miles from 
forum court . . . 
_____ (c) over which 
personal 
jurisdiction 
does exist; and  
_____ (d) who is a 
natural person. 
 
 135. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., No. C98-3477-CRB (JCS), 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23428, at *27, 1999 WL 33292943, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept 17, 1999); accord Masterobjects, Inc. 
v. eBay, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-680 JSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118943, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug 21, 2013); see 
also, e.g., Yaskawa Elec. Corp. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 201 F.R.D. 443, 444 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (observing 
that “in the absence of compelling circumstances or extreme hardship, a plaintiff should appear for a 
deposition in the forum of his choice--even if he is a nonresident.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Orrison v. The Balcor Co., 132 F.R.D. 202, 203 (N.D. Ill. 1990)); S. Seas Catamaran, Inc. v. The 
Motor Vessel “Leeway”, 120 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D.N.J. 1988)  (noting this “general rule”). 
 136. Fausto v. Credify Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 427, 429 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (relying on Doe v. 
Karadzic, Nos. 93 Civ. 878 (PKL) (HBP), 93 Civ. 1163 (PKL) (HBP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at 
*8–9, 1997 WL 45515, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1997)); accord, e.g., Thykkuttathil v. Keese, No. C12-
1749RSM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120426, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2013); Willis v. Mullins, No. 
CV-F-04-6542 AWI LJO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35627, at *16, 2006 WL 302343, * 5-6 (E.D. Cal. 
Feb. 8, 2006) (citing to Grey v. Cont’l Mktg. Assocs., 315 F. Supp. 826, 832 (N.D. Ga. 1970))); 
Mothersbaugh v. GTX, Inc., No 89-1202-FR, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4022, at *2, 1990 WL 47389, at 
*1 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 1990); Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. La Antillana, S.A., No. 88 Civ. 2670 (JFK), 1990 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13246, 1990 WL 155727 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1990). 
 137. Turner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 119 F.R.D. 381, 383 (M.D.N.C. 1988). 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
subject only to the constraints imposed by 
Rule 26.138 
 
In sum, then, if conditions (a) through (d) 
hold, neither of the two presumptions summed 
here come into play, for the examining party’s 
right to choose the deposition’s location can 
never be too inconvenient (etc.) for a party 
that is a natural person who lives less than 100 
miles from the forum court.  
2 _____ (a) Party . . . 
which 
The same presumptions discussed in Row #1 
as to the officers, directors, or managing 
agents139 to be deposed pursuant to Rule 
30(b)(1) and (b)(6) of a corporation. In other 
words, “[t]he deposition of a corporation by its 
 
 138. Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp., 232 F.R.D. 625, 628 (C.D. Cal. 2005); accord, e.g., Reishus 
v. Almaraz, No. CV-10-0760-PHX-LOA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21113, at *8–9, 2011 WL 676920, at 
*3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2011); United States v. $160,066.98 from Bank of Am., 202 F.R.D. 624, 627 (S.D. 
Cal. 2001).  
 139. Per the relevant rule’s text, this presumption extends only to directors, officers, and 
managing agents. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). However, because a corporation served under Rule 30(b)(6) 
can itself designate an agent to be deposed if the other party’s request is not specific as to person and 
title, non-managing but expressly designated agents are occasionally treated like officers, directors, and 
their managing brethren, as this article has already adduced. See supra Part II.C; Couch v. Harmony Sci. 
Acad. – El Paso, No. EP08-CA-201-FM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51085, at *14, 2009 WL 10669392, at 
*4–5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2009) (denying defendants’ request to dictate the location of the individual 
they had designated to respond to the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition as defendants’ because “the organization 
noticed for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is a party and not a non-party” (emphasis in original)); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 30(b)(6) (“The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or 
managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf . . . .”). With the caveat 
that the term “managing agent” is itself nebulous and elastic, the narrow interpretation appears the more 
appropriate. See, e.g., Richmond v. Mission Bank, No. 1:14-cv-0184-JLT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
48452, at *27, 2015 WL 1637835, at *11–12 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015). 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
_____ (b) lives less 
100 miles from 
forum court . . . 
agents and officers should ordinarily be taken 
at its principal place of business.”140 Equally 
true, the deposing party has great freedom to 
choose the deposition’s location if conditions 
(a) through (d) hold true. If the deponent is not 
a director, officer, managing agent, however, 
the deponent is treated as a non-party.141 For 
the presumption applicable to such witnesses, 
see Row 7 through 10.  
_____ (c) over which 
personal 
jurisdiction 
does exist; and 
_____ (d) which is a 
corporation. 




 140. Cadent, 232 F.R.D. at 628 (citing 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2112 (2d ed. rev. 1994)); accord, e.g., Calderon v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 
287 F.R.D. 629, 636 (D. Idaho 2012) (citing In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 473 (E.D. 
Va. 2010), and E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 268 F.R.D. 45, 54–55 (E.D. Va. 2010)); 
Hardin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-CV-0617 AWI BAM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138892, at *13–
14, 2011 WL 11563217, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011); Strategic Intent, LLC v. Strangofrd Lough 
Brewing Co. Ltd., No. CV-09-309-RHW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69131, at *6, 2010 WL 2486365, at 
*2 (E.D. Wash. June 16, 2010); Dean Foods Co. v. Eastman Chem. Co., Nos. C 00-4379 WHO, C 00-
4402 WHO (JL), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25447, at *14–16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2001).  
 141. Calderon, 287 F.R.D. at 631. 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
3 _____ (a) Party . . . 
who . . .  
Interestingly, personal jurisdiction does not 
directly affect the previously discussed 
presumptions. Indeed, in and of itself it will 
not defeat operation of the aforementioned 
rules of thumb.142 Instead, in the few cases 
even discussing this relationship, the fact that 
personal jurisdiction has been established is 
cited as one of the more compelling reasons to 
modify these presumptions.143 To wit, the 
presumptions detailed in Rows 1 and 2 operate 
regardless of personal jurisdiction.144 Its 
presence or absence, of course, may factor into 
the balancing test required by Cadent and its 
progeny. 
_____ (b) lives less 
100 miles from 
forum court . . . 
_____ (c) over which 
personal 
jurisdiction 
does not exist; 
and  
_____ (d) who is a 
natural person. 
 
 142. Sloniger v. Deja, No. 09CV858S, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134414, at *26–28, 2010 WL 
5343184, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2010) (citing two non-California cases which applied variants of the 
Cadent test and concluding that the existence of personal jurisdiction could not “overcome the 
presumption under federal law that a non-resident defendant should be deposed in his place of 
residence” absent “extraordinary circumstances”); Wallace v. Hounshel, No. 1:06-cv-1560-RLY-TAB, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6607, at *2–4, 2008 WL 282069, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 29, 2008) (alluding its 
own lack of personal jurisdiction over the deponent, but not considering it as decisive, and ultimately 
applying the presumption). 
 143. Custom Form Mfg., Inc. v. Omron Corp., 196 F.R.D. 333, 336 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (“When a 
foreign corporation is doing business in the United States, is subject to the court’s jurisdiction, and has 
freely taken advantage of our federal rules of discovery, exceptions to the general rule on the location of 
depositions are often made.” (emphasis added) (collecting cases)); see also Metcalf v. Bay Ferries Ltd., 
No. 12-40075-TSH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98538, at *3–4, 2014 WL 3670786, at *1–2 (D. Mass. July 
21, 2014) (ordering a foreign company to present its agent for deposition in Massachusetts, as plaintiffs’ 
counsel requested in the relevant notice); New Medium Techs. LLC v. Barco N.V., 242 F.R.D. 460, 466 
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (quoting Custom Form Mfg., Inc., 196 F.R.D. at 336); I Create Int’l, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 
No. 03 Civ. 3993 (JFK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15477, at *14, 2004 WL 1774250, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 9, 2004) (noting that the disparity in means which may justify transfer to a venue where personal 
jurisdiction exists may impact how a court exercises its discretionary power over depositions’ location). 
 144. See Custom Form Mfg., Inc., 196 F.R.D. at 336. 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
4 _____ (a) Party . . . 
which . . . 
The same analysis regarding the location of 
natural parties over whom personal 
jurisdiction does not exist extends to 
corporations with one change. If an officer, 
director, or managing agent is to be deposed, 
the presumption is different than if merely an 
employee is involved. The latter are treated as 
non-party witnesses, for whom different 
presumptions, detailed in Rows 7 through 10, 
apply. 
_____ (b) lives less 
100 miles from 
forum court . . . 
_____ (c) over which 
personal 
jurisdiction 
does not exist; 
and  
_____ (d) which is a 
corporation. 
** Only difference between (3) and (4) is (d). *** 
  
25
Shachmurove: Contesting Deposition Locations
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019






Presumptive Location of Deposition 
5 _____ (a) Party . . . who 
. . . 
Within most circuits, the presumption 
summarized in Row 1 is regularly invoked 
here so long as a subpoena under Rule 
45(c)(1) is not employed. Thus, “the rule 
that the place of depositions is 
presumptively where the deponent resides 
applies.”145 
 
A matter purely of degree, one difference 
can be discerned: this same presumption is 
even stronger when a party is so far 
removed from the forum court. So 
animated, as court after court within this 
circuit has repeated, “[w]hen a deponent 
resides at a substantial distance from the 
deposing party’s residence, the deposing 
party should be required to take the 
deposition at a location in the vicinity in 
which the deponent resides, even if the 
deponent is a party.”146 
 
Notably, whether or not “substantial 
distance” is identical to “more than 100 
_____ (b) lives more 
than 100 miles 
from forum court 
. . . 
_____ (c) over which 
personal 
jurisdiction does 
exist; and  
 
 145. Berry v. Baca, No. CV 01-02069 DDP (SHx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15698, at *10, 2002 
WL 1777412, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2002); accord $160,066.98, 202 F.R.D. at 627.  
 146. Gen. Leasing Co. v. Lawrence Photo-Graphic Supply, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 130, 131 (W.D. Mo. 
1979) (emphasis added); see also Mothersbaugh v. GTX, Inc., No 89-1202-FR, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4022, at *2, 1990 WL 47389, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 1990) (quoting Gen. Leasing Co., 84 F.R.D. at 
131)); accord, e.g., Clairmont v. Genuity, Inc., No. C02-1876L, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20784, at *2–3, 
2004 WL 2287781, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2004) (quoting Metrex Res. Corp. v. United States, 151 
F.R.D. 122, 125 (D. Colo. 1993)). 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
_____ (d) who is a 
natural person. 
miles” is unclear. Nonetheless, as Rule 
32(a)(4)(B) defines an unavailable witness 
as one who “is more than 100 miles from 
the place of hearing or trial or is outside the 
United States,”147 and per the embedded 
mandate of Rule 1,148 it would be logical 
and reasonable to so consider it. 
6 _____ (a) Party . . . 
which . . . 
The same analysis in Row 5 extends to 
corporations with one change. If an officer, 
director, or managing agent is to be 
deposed, the presumption is different than if 
merely an employee is involved. The former 
are subject to the same stronger-than-usual 
presumption summarized in Row 5; the 
latter (i.e. non- managing agents) are treated 
as non-party witnesses, to whom a different 
presumption applies. For the applicable 
rules, see Rows 7 through 10.  
_____ (b) lives more 
than 100 miles 
from forum court 
. . . 




_____ (d) which is a 
corporation. 
*** Only difference between (5) and (6) is (d). *** 
  
 
 147. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(B); Delgado v. Pawtucket Police Dep’t, 668 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 
2012). 
 148. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964) (contending 
that “the Rules were intended to embody a unitary concept of efficient and meaningful judicial 
procedure, and that no single Rule can consequently be considered in a vacuum”). 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
7 _____ (a) Non-party . . . 
who . . .  
Whether or not a deponent is a party or a 
non-party, the general presumption remains 
the same: they ought to be deposed where 
the deponent resides or has its/his/her 
principal place of business.149 However, 
unlike the other precepts previously 
delineated, because “an ordinary non-party 
witness” can only be deposed via “a 
subpoena” under Rule 45, this presumption 
is essentially statutory150 and delimitated by 
mileage.151 Per Rule 45(c)(1)(A), a 
subpoena can command a person to attend a 
deposition only “within 100 miles of where 
the person resides, is employed, or regularly 
 
 149. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784(WHP), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
80905, at *11, 2012 WL 2108220, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012) (collecting cases). A few federal 
courts in California have implicitly endorsed this approach. Berry, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15698, at 
*11, 2002 WL 1777412, at *3 (endorsing the general rule, which applies to parties and non-parties alike, 
that “the place of depositions is presumptively where the deponent resides,” applicable “‘even if the 
deponent is a party’” (emphasis added)). 
 150. Since the Rules have the force and effect of law, their commands can be described as 
“statutory.” Morel v. Daimler-Chrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. Indymac MBS, 
Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 108 n.14 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . have the force and 
effect of a federal statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin 
(In re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Rules are binding and courts must 
abide by them unless there is an irreconcilable conflict with the Bankruptcy Code.”), abrogated on other 
grounds, United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 176 L. Ed. 158 
(2010); Shachmurove, supra note 9, at 511 n.2 (citing these and other cases). 
 151. Calderon v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 629, 631 (D. Idaho 2012); cf. 
Symantec Corp. v. Acronis, Inc., No. 11-cv-5310 EMC (JSC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17505, at *4–5, 
2013 WL 503612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013) (opining that if a person is a non-party “[their] 
deposition must be sought by third-party subpoena”). 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
_____ (b) works/lives 
less 100 miles 
from forum 
court. 
transacts business.”152 In this scenario, with 
the forum court being within 100 miles of 
non-party’s residence, no possible 
deposition location within that area can 
violate the rule.153 
 
8 
_____ (a) Non-party . . . 
who . . . 
Element (b) is key here, effectively 
propagating one more presumption. Quite 
simply, a non-party cannot be deposed more 
than “100 miles . . . [from] where the person 
resides, is employed, or regularly transacts 
business.”154 This strict reading of Rule 45 
widely prevails.155 Numerous courts within 
the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit have 
followed it as well.156  
 
Arguably, the Ninth Circuit did so as well 
 
 152. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A); In re Apple, Inc., 581 F. App’x 886, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Rule 
45(c)(1)(B) dispenses with the 100-mile limitation, allowing for depositions to be held “within the state 
where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person,” but only so long as 
that person is “a party or a party’s officer” or is being commanded “to attend a trial,” not a deposition, 
“and would not [thereby] incur substantial expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(B). 
 153. The 100-mile limitation has been criticized as archaic, particularly inappropriate in the 
context of complex and multidistrict litigation. See Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 213, 
221–22 (E.D. La. 2008) (collecting cases). 
 154. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A). 
 155. State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Camden, No. 08-5128(NLH)(AMD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
65142, at *7, 2010 WL 2719810, at *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010) (“[N]umerous cases throughout the 
country . . . make it clear that a court must quash any subpoena that calls for a deposition beyond the 
100 mile limit for non-party witness.”); Edelman v. Taittinger (In re Edelman), 295 F.3d 171, 178 (2d 
Cir. 2002). Consequently, the discretion which courts normally have about locating depositions does not 
exist when Rule 45 applies, as it does regarding non-party deponents. State Nat’l Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 65142, at *7, 2010 WL 2719810, at *3.  
 156. See, e.g., Dolezal v. Fritch, No. CV-08-1362-PHX-DGC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26238, at 
*3–4, 2009 WL 764542, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 23, 2009); Mothersbaugh v. GTX, Inc., No 89-1202-FR, 
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4022, at *2, 1990 WL 47389, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 1990). 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
_____ (b) works/lives 
more than 100 
miles from forum 
court. 
when it found it was not an abuse of 
discretion for a district court, under Rule 
45(d)(1), “to protect this witness from the 
burden of traveling overseas for 
examination” by ordering that the 
deposition of a non-party witness take place 
in that deponent’s domicile (Sweden).157  
*** Only difference between (7) and (8) is (b). *** 
  
 
 157. Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
9 _____ (a) Non-party . . 
. who . . . 
The presumptions summarized in Rows 8 
and 9 control. For non-parties, the 100-mile 
limitation is the key factor, not the fact that 
the person lives abroad, though a person’s 
foreign residence will affect how service of a 
subpoena can be made and whether a 
deposition can even he held.158 
_____ (b) works/lives 
abroad; and . . .  
_____ (c) who is not a 
United States 
citizen. 
10 _____ (a) Non-party . . 
. who . . . 
As to Row 10, the same presumptions 
summarized in Rows 8 and 9 govern here, 
though they are undeniably weaker due to a 
suddenly applicable statute. To summarize, if 
the non-party is a United States citizen, § 
1783(a) governs. 
 
Under that statute, “[a] court of the United 
States may order the issuance of a subpoena 
requiring the appearance as a witness before 
it, or before a person or body designated by 
it, of a national or resident of the United 
States who is in a foreign country.”159 Two 
 
 158. See, e.g., In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 300 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]he Federal Rules are ‘the normal methods’ for federal litigation involving foreign national parties 
unless the ‘optional’ or ‘supplemental’ [Hague] Convention procedures prove to be conducive to 
discovery under some circumstances.”); United States v. Afram Lines, Ltd., 159 F.R.D. 408, 413 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[Non-party] witness[es] must be subpoenaed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, or, if the witness is overseas, the procedures of the Hague Convention or other 
applicable treaty must be utilized.”). Briefly, while the presumption as to location does not change, a 
more onerous service process, lodged in Rule 4(f), must be followed. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f); Estate of 
Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 412 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 159. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2014). 
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Presumptive Location of Deposition 
_____ (b) works/lives 
abroad; and . . .  
conditions must be met before a court may 
authorize a subpoena’s issuance pursuant to 
this section: (a) “that particular testimony or 
the production of the document or other thing 
by him is necessary in the interest of justice,” 
and (b) “in other than a criminal action or 
proceeding, if the court finds, in addition, 
that it is not possible to obtain his testimony 
in admissible form without his personal 
appearance . . . in any other manner.”160 The 
subpoena must still be served “in accordance 
with the provisions of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure relating to service of process 
on a person in a foreign country,”161 which 
are encoded in Rule 4(f).162 While this statute 
technically creates no more than personal 
jurisdiction over the proposed deponent,163 
three facts—(a) it allows a court to order a 
US citizen to appear for a deposition; (b) 
international procedures may be uncertain or 
unavailable; and (c) a United States’ court’s 
jurisdiction to enforce compulsion with any 
subpoena evaporates outside of the United 
States—weaken the normal (and here 
especially) “strong presumption that foreign 
defendants should be deposed at their 
principal place of business or near their 
residence.”164  
_____ (c) who is a 
United States 
citizen. 
*** Only difference between (9) and (10) is (c). *** 
 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. § 1783(b). 
 162. However, in contrast with the service of subpoenas on non-U.S. citizens, “[t]he person 
serving the subpoena shall tender to the person to whom the subpoena is addressed his estimated 
necessary travel and attendance expenses.” Id. 
 163. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438, 52 S. Ct. 252, 255, 76 L. Ed. 375 (1929). 
 164. SEC v. Banc de Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *28, 
2014 WL 1030862, at *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2014); SEC v. Sabhlok, No. C 08-4238 CRB (JL), 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105194, at *15–24, 2009 WL 3561523, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009) (discussing 
facts (a) through (b) and balancing the hardships in such a way as to justify ordering a foreign national 
covered by § 1783 to be deposed in the United States). 
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